We show that a purely private monetary system is inherently unstable due to the role of endogenous debt limits in the creation of private money. Because people's ability to issue notes (personal liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange) depends on beliefs about the exchange value of their notes in future periods, there exist multiple equilibria. Some of these equilibria have undesirable properties: Self-ful…lling panics are possible outcomes. In response to this inherent instability of private money, we formulate a government intervention that ensures the determinacy of equilibrium. In particular, we de…ne an operational procedure for a monetary authority capable of ensuring the stability and e¢ ciency of the monetary system.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in monetary economics is the following: Can we rely on private agents to provide an e¢ cient and stable monetary framework? Some economists have argued that the government monopoly in the creation of outside money is itself a source of instability and that private markets are capable of providing a sound monetary framework.
Others have argued that government control over the monetary system is necessary for achieving stability. These concerns go back at least to Friedman (1960) , Klein (1974) , and Hayek (1976) . 1 In particular, there has been much emphasis on two polar views. Friedman (1960) has argued that the government should be the sole issuer of currency because private creation of government money substitutes will necessarily lead to excessive volatility and, consequently, an unstable monetary system. In the other extreme, we have the argument made in Hayek (1976) that private agents through private markets can e¤ectively achieve desirable outcomes, even in the …eld of money and banking. According to this view, there is no reason to believe that any form of government intervention is necessary for the establishment of a stable and e¢ cient monetary system. Recent developments in monetary theory have provided a rigorous theoretical framework to evaluate the bene…ts of alternative monetary arrangements. Some prominent papers analyzing the issue include Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) , Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , Williamson (1999) , Smith and Weber (1999), Azariadis, Bullard, and Smith (2001) , Li (2001 Li ( , 2006 , Martin and Schreft (2006) , Berentsen (2006) , Mills (2007) , He, Huang, and Wright (2008) , and Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (forthcoming), among many others. Our paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we demonstrate the existence of an inherent instability associated with a monetary system in which privately issued notes are the only available medium of exchange. As will be clear, the role of endogenous debt limits in the creation of private money will be crucial for understanding our results. Second, in response to this intrinsic in-stability, we characterize a government intervention that ensures monetary stability. Thus, our results suggest that the argument in favor of a purely private monetary system can be misleading and that a speci…c form of monetary intervention is socially desirable.
Our analysis builds on the ideas in Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) . These environments are characterized by the absence of commitment, and the threat of exclusion from some kinds of trading arrangements is su¢ cient to induce cooperative behavior. We build on this idea to formulate the decision problem of an agent whose personal liabilities may circulate as a medium of exchange.
The physical structure of our model and the pattern of trade it implies build on Lagos and Wright (2005) . In particular, buyers and sellers trade sequentially in centralized and decentralized markets. They are anonymous and lack any commitment, which implies that any form of trade credit is infeasible. Thus, they need a medium of exchange to conduct their transactions. As in Wallace (1999a, 1999b ), a subset of private agents, referred to as bankers, will have their actions publicly monitored so that their personal liabilities may be used as a medium of exchange. This possibility, combined with the existence of a mechanism to punish any banker who fails to ful…ll any promise of converting his liabilities into commodities, results in a monetary arrangement in which privately issued liabilities, referred to as notes, circulate as a means of payment.
In our framework, each banker's willingness to redeem any previously issued note at par value depends on the continuation value of his business, given that the punishment for unilaterally suspending the convertibility of his notes into commodities is the loss of his record-keeping privileges. This value is determined by the exchange value of his notes in future periods. Thus, more favorable monetary conditions in future periods imply that he will be less inclined to renege on his promises, raising his ability to issue notes today.
Because the value of his business today depends on beliefs about the future exchange value of his notes, we show that there will be multiple equilibria. In particular, we show that some of these equilibria have undesirable properties: Some of them are characterized by a self-ful…lling collapse of the banking system in which each banker's balance sheet will persistently shrink over time, resulting in a continuous decline in the aggregate supply of bank notes, together with a persistent depreciation of their exchange value.
We also show that any equilibrium characterized by large ‡uctuations in the supply of bank liabilities is necessarily ine¢ cient, giving us a rationale for considering some form of government intervention. In particular, we formulate a government intervention that guarantees the determinacy of equilibrium, in which case the economy remains arbitrarily close to the constrained e¢ cient allocation. Thus, the proposed intervention allows us to simultaneously achieve the goals of e¢ ciency and stability.
Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999), using a standard random-matching model, have
shown that a private monetary system can be stable. They introduce a mechanism for note exchange that makes the creation of private money possible. Such a mechanism imposes that any banker who fails to redeem his notes on demand will lose his note-issuing privileges.
As a result, it is possible to obtain cooperation due to the threat of exclusion from the business of issuing notes, disciplining the amount of notes issued by any individual banker.
In particular, they have shown that a version of the law of re ‡ux holds, guaranteeing that bankers do not overissue notes. Because of the di¢ culty of solving for equilibrium in such an environment, the authors restrict their analysis to stationary equilibria. Our goal is precisely to emphasize nonstationary allocations, paying particular attention to the dynamics. And we show that the analysis of nonstationary equilibria matters for the conclusions regarding the stability and e¢ ciency of a private monetary system. Azariadis, Bullard, and Smith (2001) have characterized the dynamic properties of a purely private monetary system and a hybrid system in which privately and publicly issued notes coexist. The authors construct an overlapping generations model in which trade is imperfectly coordinated due to spatial separation. As a result, private liabilities can circulate as a medium of exchange. In contrast to their analysis, our framework emphasizes the role of endogenous debt limits in the creation of private money. This emphasis results in very di¤erent conclusions. In particular, we show that a purely private monetary system can result in very large ‡uctuations that, in most cases, drive the economy to autarky, as a result of a self-ful…lling collapse of the banking system.
A recent paper by Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2012) also emphasizes the role of endogenous debt limits in determining the dynamics of pure credit economies. The authors construct a model of bilateral credit in which endogenous debt limits arise because of agents' inability to commit to their promises, in which case individual debt limits today depend on future credit conditions. In particular, they show that the set of equilibrium allocations can be very large, with some of them displaying interesting dynamics: Both deterministic and stochastic cycles as well as chaos are possible outcomes. In our analysis, we …nd that some of the properties they …nd in their model are also observed in ours, despite the fact that private IOUs circulate in our model but not in theirs. We take the analysis one step further and ask the question: Is there an intervention that guarantees the stability of the monetary system? Thus, our contribution is to formulate a government intervention that ensures the determinacy of equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic framework, and we discuss its main components in Section 3. In Section 4, we formulate and solve the planner's problem. In Section 5, we characterize equilibrium allocations under a purely private monetary system. In Section 6, we discuss government intervention. In Section 7, we provide some historical background. Section 8 concludes.
MODEL
Time t = 0; 1; 2; ::: is discrete, and the horizon is in…nite. Each period is divided into two subperiods. There are two physical commodities: good 1 and good 2. There are three types of in…nitely lived agents, referred to as buyer, seller, and banker, with a [0; 1] continuum of each type. Good 1 can be produced only in the …rst subperiod, and good 2 can be produced only in the second subperiod. If not properly stored, good 1 will perish completely. There is a productive storage technology that returns 1 > 1 units of good 1 at date t + 1 for each unit invested at date t. Good 2 cannot be stored and completely depreciates if not immediately consumed.
Sellers want to consume good 1 but cannot produce it. Buyers are able to produce this good using a divisible technology that delivers one unit of the good for each unit of e¤ort they exert. Buyers want to consume good 2, but only sellers are able to produce it. In particular, sellers are endowed with a divisible technology that requires one unit of e¤ort to produce each unit of good 2. Finally, bankers want to consume good 1 but cannot produce either good.
We now explicitly describe preferences. Let y t 2 R + denote a buyer's e¤ort level in the …rst subperiod, and let q t 2 R + denote his consumption in the second subperiod. His preferences are represented by
where 2 (0; 1). The function u : R + ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, with u 0 (0) = 1. Let x t 2 R + denote a seller's consumption in the …rst subperiod, and let n t 2 R + denote his e¤ort level in the second subperiod. His preferences are represented by
where c : R + ! R + is twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing, and convex. Let z t 2 R + denote a banker's consumption in the …rst subperiod. Each banker has preferences represented by
Buyers and sellers are anonymous, and their trading histories are privately observable.
The trading history of each banker is publicly observable. All types of agents lack any commitment. In the …rst subperiod, all agents interact in a centralized location. In the second subperiod, all buyers and all sellers leave the centralized location, and each buyer is randomly matched with a seller. Following the literature, we refer to this market as the decentralized market. We also assume that buyers and sellers do not overlap in the centralized location. In particular, all buyers arrive at the centralized location …rst and leave the centralized location before all sellers arrive. Bankers never leave the centralized location, so they do not participate in the decentralized market.
Each banker has a technology that allows him to create, at zero cost, divisible and durable objects, referred to as notes, that perfectly identify him. Thus, notes issued by one banker are perfectly distinguishable from those issued by any other banker so that counterfeiting will not be a problem. As will become clear, a note issued by a banker will be a promise to pay goods on demand and, for this reason, will be used as a medium of exchange. Finally, we assume the existence of a mechanism (a regulatory framework) that automatically punishes any banker who fails to ful…ll any promise of converting his notes into goods on demand.
Precisely, we assume that a banker who unilaterally suspends the convertibility of his notes into goods will lose his record-keeping privileges. Moreover, any asset he holds when he reneges on his promises will be immediately seized.
DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
Our framework builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . 2 In the decentralized market, the absence of recordkeeping, together with people's inability to commit to their promises, implies that a buyer and a seller can trade only if a medium of exchange is made available. In the case of a purely private monetary system, each banker will issue personal liabilities that will be used as a medium of exchange, provided that people believe he will be willing to redeem them at par value at a future date. In this case, each seller is willing to accept these liabilities as a means of payment, so each buyer is willing to use them as a means of payment. Figure 1 shows how a banker's note will circulate in the economy.
In this respect, the availability of public knowledge of the banker's trading history, together with the possibility of punishing any banker who reneges on his promises, is crucial for the circulation of private IOUs. In the decentralized market, a seller does not trust a buyer's IOU because he knows the latter cannot be punished in case of default. But the same seller may accept a banker's IOU as a means of payment because a banker can be punished if he fails to ful…ll his promise of converting his IOUs into goods on demand.
The assumption that buyers and sellers do not overlap in the centralized location, com- 2 An alternative tractable framework that also creates an essential role for a medium of exchange is the large household model in Shi (1997) .
bined with the absence of search frictions in the decentralized market, implies that a banker's liabilities, in the form of notes redeemable on demand, will be periodically redeemed in the centralized location. The banker's willingness to pay his note holders today will depend on the exchange value of his notes in future periods. If future monetary conditions are more favorable for him, then the continuation value of his business is higher, so he will be less inclined to renege on his promises. As a result, his ability to borrow funds today through the sale of notes increases because his liability holders know that he will have more to lose in case he reneges on his promises. This means that the creation of bank notes at any given date will crucially depend on beliefs about future monetary conditions. And this is the key to understanding our results.
Finally, note that goods invested in the storage technology will not be available for use in the decentralized market. Because buyers are anonymous and lack any commitment, they cannot credibly use claims on the goods invested in this technology as a means of payment in the decentralized market, since they cannot commit to deliver them in the following period. Thus, the storage technology corresponds to the concept of illiquid capital in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008).
EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
Here we formulate and solve the planner's problem under the assumption that the planner perfectly observes each banker's actions. The planner has to explicitly account for people's desire to deviate from his proposed allocation. Also, for any allocation he wants to implement, he needs to take into account the lack of public information about bilateral meetings in the second subperiod. In particular, he does not observe whether a seller produces for a buyer in the second subperiod. As a result, each buyer will have to acquire a banker's note in order to transfer it to a seller in the second subperiod. To acquire a note in the …rst subperiod, the buyer needs to produce the amount y t 2 R + of good 1 and transfer it to a banker. When the seller arrives at the centralized location, he is entitled to some amount of good 1 only if he presents a note to the planner (a proof that he has produced for a buyer in the previous period). The seller will be able to acquire a note by producing the amount q t 2 R + of good 2 to the buyer with whom he is matched in the second subperiod.
If the seller presents a note to the planner in the following period, then he will be entitled to receive the amount x t+1 2 R + of good 1 from the banker who has issued the note. Each banker is then instructed to destroy any note he has previously issued. Finally, the planner determines the amounts y t , q t , and x t at each date.
Let U b 2 R denote the required lifetime utility initially assigned to each banker, and let U s 2 R denote the required lifetime utility initially assigned to each seller. The planner's problem then consists of choosing an allocation fy t ; x t ; z t ; q t ; n t g the seller's participation constraint, c (q t ) + x t+1 0 for each date t 0, and the banker's individual rationality constraint,
Note that, in the …rst subperiod, each banker is entitled to receive the amount y t of good 1 from a buyer in exchange for his note. Also, the planner instructs each banker to transfer the amount x t y t to a seller if the latter presents any of his previously issued notes. The banker can refuse to make such a transfer to the seller and increase his consumption of good 1 by the amount x t , to be interpreted as the decision of suspending convertibility. The punishment for such a deviation will be permanent exclusion from the exchange system designed by the social planner, resulting in the autarkic payo¤. The banker's individual rationality constraint guarantees that he will prefer not to deviate from the planner's allocation. Note also that the buyer's and seller's participation constraints ensure that both the buyer and the seller …nd it optimal to produce in the …rst and second subperiods, respectively, in order to acquire a note.
Ignore for a moment the seller's and buyer's participation constraints. In this case, we can rewrite the planner's problem as follows:
Let 2 R + denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2), let 2 R + denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3), and let t t 2 R + denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (4) at date t. The …rst-order conditions for an interior solution are given
for all t 0, together with the complementary slackness conditions,
This means that we must have t = 0 for all t 0, for some constant 2 R + . This
for each date t 0. Therefore, it follows that q t = q for each date t 0. Thus, a necessary condition for any e¢ cient allocation is to have a constant amount for the production of good 2.
If = 0, then we have q t = q for all t 0, with q satisfying
in which case the banker's individual rationality constraint is not binding. A stationary solution is then given by q t = q , x t = (1 ) U s +c (q ), and
for all t 0. For this case to arise, the values U s and U b must satisfy
We refer to this solution as an unconstrained e¢ cient allocation.
Another possibility is to have > 0, in which case the allocation q t = q < q for all t 0,
together with x t = (1 ) U s + c (q) and y t = (1 ) U s + U b + c (q) for all t 0, is a solution to the planner's problem, provided that the values U s and U b satisfy
In this case, the banker's individual rationality constraint binds at each date, and we refer to this solution as a constrained e¢ cient allocation.
Finally, we need to verify whether the buyer's and seller's participation constraints are satis…ed. The seller's participation constraint is satis…ed provided that
where q is a …xed amount in the interval (0; q ] that depends on the speci…c choice of . In particular, suppose that we make each seller indi¤erent between producing and not producing for a buyer in the second subperiod, which requires setting U s = 1 c (q) so that condition (7) holds with equality. In this case, we have
If 2 u (q) c (q) 0, then we can guarantee that the buyer's participation constraint is satis…ed. Throughout the paper, we assume that the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to one such that 2 u (q ) c (q ) 0.
PRIVATE MONETARY SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the equilibrium outcome of an economy without intervention.
In this economy, the money supply is completely endogenous: Each banker issues private liabilities that can be used as a medium of exchange so that the aggregate money supply depends entirely on his willingness to expand his balance sheet.
To …nance his operations at date t, a typical banker raises funds by selling notes to buyers. Then, he uses these funds to invest in the storage technology. At date t + 1, he collects the proceeds from his investments and pays anyone who presents one of his notes for redemption, consuming or reinvesting the remaining pro…ts. Speci…cally, a note issued by a banker at date t gives him one unit of good 1 and is a promise to pay R t units of good 1 at date t + 1 to the note holder, so we can think of R t as the face value of a note.
Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in which all notes trade at the same price. This means that, in equilibrium, the notes issued by any pair of bankers will be perfect substitutes, which happens if and only if people believe both bankers will be willing to redeem them at par value. Every agent in the economy will take the sequence of prices fR t g 1 t=0 as given when making his individual decisions, so the market for bank notes is perfectly competitive. 3 A banker will be able to issue notes only if he has not previously suspended the convertibility of his notes into goods. If a banker reneges on his promises, then he will lose his note-issuing privileges and will have his assets seized.
Buyer' s Decision Problem
Let w b t (a) denote the value function for a buyer holding a 2 R + notes at the beginning of the …rst market, and let v b t (a) denote the value function for a buyer holding a 2 R + notes at the beginning of the second market. The Bellman equation for a buyer in the …rst subperiod is given by
subject to the budget constraint a 0 = y + R t 1 a. 3 We assume that the Walrasian auctioneer takes into account the demand for notes in both rounds of interaction during the …rst subperiod: when all buyers and all bankers initially interact in the centralized location and, subsequently, when all sellers and all bankers interact.
Here a 0 denotes his choice of note holdings at the end of the …rst market. In the case of an interior solution for y, the value w b t (a) is an a¢ ne function, w b t (a) = R t 1 a + w b t (0), with the intercept given by
In the decentralized market, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller. The buyer chooses the amount of good 2, denoted by q 2 R + , that the seller is supposed to produce and the quantity of notes, denoted by d 2 R + , that he is supposed to transfer to the seller. Formally, the terms of trade (q; d) are determined by the solution to the following problem:
subject to the seller's participation constraint
and the buyer's cash constraint
where a 2 R + is the amount of notes the buyer has taken with him into the decentralized market. The solution to this problem is as follows:
The Bellman equation for a buyer holding a 0 2 R + notes at the beginning of the second market is given by
Using the fact that w b t (a) is an a¢ ne function, we can rewrite (10) as follows:
The …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of note holdings is given by
with equality if a 0 > 0. If R t < 1 , then the optimal choice of note holdings will be given
in which case q t (a 0 ) = c 1 ( R t a 0 ). Note that all buyers choose to hold the same quantity of notes at the end of the …rst market and, consequently, purchase the same amount of good 2 in each bilateral meeting. Thus, condition (11) gives the aggregate demand for notes as a function of the face value R t .
Seller' s Decision Problem
Let w s t (a) denote the value function for a seller holding a 2 R + notes at the beginning of the …rst market, and let v s t (a) denote the value function for a seller holding a 2 R + notes at the beginning of the second market. The Bellman equation for a seller in the …rst subperiod is given by
subject to the budget constraint
Here a 0 denotes his choice of note holdings at the end of the …rst market. In the case of an interior solution for x, the value w s t (a) is an a¢ ne function, w s t (a) = R t 1 a + w s t (0), with the intercept given by
The Bellman equation for a seller holding a 0 2 R + notes at the beginning of the second market is given by
whereã 2 R + denotes the note holdings of the buyer with whom the seller will be matched in the decentralized market. Here we have taken as given the fact that, in equilibrium, all buyers choose the same quantity of notes at the end of the …rst market. Using the fact that w s t (a) is an a¢ ne function, we can rewrite (13) as follows:
Thus, the …rst-order condition for the optimal choice of note holdings is given by
with equality if a 0 > 0. This means that the seller will not hold notes at the end of the …rst market if R t < 1 .
Banker' s Decision Problem
Now we describe the decision problem of a typical banker. Let w n t (b t 1 ; i t 1 ) denote the value function for a banker with liabilities b t 1 and assets i t 1 at the beginning of date t.
The banker's assets at the beginning of date t consist of the amount invested in the storage technology at date t 1, whereas his liabilities refer to the number of notes issued at date t 1. Thus, the banker's decision problem can be formulated as follows:
and the debt limit
Here i t denotes the amount of resources (units of good 1) that the banker decides to invest at date t. In other words, i t gives the banker's assets at the beginning of date t + 1. When making his investment decisions at each date, the banker takes as given the sequence of debt limits B t 1 t=0
and the sequence of prices fR t g 1 t=0 . If R t < 1 , then the banker …nds it optimal to borrow up to his debt limit, i.e., he chooses b t = B t . Because the return paid on his notes (his cost of funds) is lower than the return on his assets, he makes a positive pro…t by borrowing through the sale of notes and investing the proceeds in the storage technology. Note also that, because the return on his assets equals his rate of time preference, he is indi¤erent between immediately consuming and reinvesting the proceeds from his previously accumulated pro…ts (his retained earnings).
Therefore, an optimal investment decision is given by i t = B t , which means that the banker invests all funds he has borrowed at date t but does not use his own funds. Thus, the balance sheet of a typical banker will have no equity, only debt. In this case, the banker's consumption at date t is simply given by
Thus, at each date t, the banker's lifetime utility is given by
This means that his lifetime utility at any point in time depends on the sequence of individual debt limits and the face value of notes in future periods.
Aggregate Note Holdings
Let a t denote the aggregate note holdings at date t. For any value R t < 1 , the constraint (9) will bind, in which case the value of all notes in circulation must equal the value of production in the second market:
Note that we can rewrite (11) as follows:
This condition determines the production of good 2 in each bilateral meeting as a function of the face value of notes. We can use (16) to implicitly de…ne q t = q (R t ), in which case q 0 (R t ) > 0 for any R t > 0. Thus, a higher face value results in a larger amount produced and traded in each bilateral meeting. The aggregate note holdings as a function of the value R t are given by
Note that a 0 (R t ) > 0 for any R t > 0. This means that a higher face value results in a higher demand for notes.
Equilibrium
To de…ne an equilibrium, we need to specify the sequence of individual debt limits B t 1 t=0
in such a way that each banker is willing to supply the amount of notes other people demand and is willing to ful…ll his promise of converting notes into goods on demand. We take two steps to de…ne debt limits satisfying these two conditions. First, for any given sequence
at each date t. This condition guarantees that, given R t , each banker is willing to supply the amount of notes in (17) so that the market for bank notes will clear at each date. Then, given this choice for the individual debt limits, we need to verify whether a particular choice for the sequence fR t g 1 t=0 implies that each banker does not want to renege on his promises. Thus, a particular sequence fR t g 1 t=0 is consistent with convertibility if and only if
holds at each date t. As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these constraints allow the banker to borrow (through the sale of notes) as much as possible without inducing him to suspend the convertibility of his notes into goods. The left-hand side gives the banker's beginning-ofperiod lifetime utility. The right-hand side gives the short-term payo¤ the banker gets if he decides not to invest the resources he has borrowed at date t. In this case, he can increase his current consumption by the amount a (R t ), but he will inevitably suspend convertibility at date t + 1, resulting in the autarkic payo¤ from date t + 1 onward.
As in Alvarez and Jermann, we want to allow each banker to issue as many notes as possible and, at the same time, make sure that he keeps his promises. If we de…ne individual debt limits that are not too tight, then we can rewrite the convertibility constraints as follows:
where w n t denotes the banker's lifetime utility at the beginning of date t,
We can also rewrite (14) as follows:
Note that the term a (R t 1 ) 1 R t 1 gives the banker's current pro…t at date t. Specifically, at date t 1, the banker received the amount a (R t 1 ) in exchange for his notes and invested this amount in the storage technology, obtaining the revenue 1 a (R t 1 ) at date t. Because each note issued at date t 1 is a promise to pay R t 1 units of good 1 at date t, his current disbursement is given by R t 1 a (R t 1 ). Thus, his pro…t will be given by the di¤erence between the revenue 1 a (R t 1 ) and the disbursement R t 1 a (R t 1 ). As we have seen, he will immediately consume any pro…t he makes.
Combining (19) with (20), we obtain the following equilibrium law of motion for the face value of notes:
The formal de…nition of a perfect-foresight equilibrium is now straightforward.
De…nition 1 A symmetric monetary equilibrium is a sequence fR t g 1 t=0 satisfying 0 R t 1 and (21) at each date t.
Note that (19) indicates that the supply of notes today depends on the exchange value of notes in future periods. If future monetary conditions are more favorable for each banker, then the value of his note-issuing privileges is higher, making it more costly for him to renege on his promises. In this case, the supply of notes today is higher. If future monetary conditions are less favorable for each banker, then he will be more inclined to renege on his promises. In this case, the supply of notes today is lower.
The following result formally establishes the existence and uniqueness of a non-autarkic stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 2 R t = 1 for all t 0 is the unique non-autarkic stationary equilibrium.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the constant sequence R t = 1 for all t 0 satis…es (21). The uniqueness of this interior solution immediately follows from the fact that a 0 (R) > 0 for any R > 0. In this case, the amount of good 2 produced by the seller in each bilateral meeting is given by u 0 (q) c 0 (q) = 1 .
Q.E.D.
In this equilibrium, the exchange value of notes remains constant over time. People do not expect monetary conditions to change over time so that the amount of notes issued at each date, as well as their face value, remains constant over time. In particular, people expect the face value of each bank note to be one in all future periods and know that, as long as the amount raised from the sale of notes equals a (1) for each banker at each date, the banker will …nd it optimal to maintain the convertibility of his notes into goods. As a result, no banker will ever renege on his promises along the equilibrium path.
From our characterization of e¢ cient allocations, we can easily conclude that the stationary equilibrium we have just described is constrained e¢ cient. In other words, it is a solution to the planner's problem for an appropriate choice of the initially required utility levels U s and U n .
Proposition 3
The non-autarkic stationary equilibrium R t = 1 for all t 0 is constrained e¢ cient.
This means that a purely private monetary system is capable of implementing a constrained e¢ cient allocation. Thus, in principle, we could conclude that there is no external-ity necessarily associated with the creation of private money. However, as we will see, it is possible to have other equilibria for which the exchange value of notes will not be constant over time. These equilibria will arise because other beliefs about the exchange value of notes in future periods will also be consistent with an equilibrium outcome. In these equilibria, the amount of goods produced and traded in the decentralized market will vary over time.
The dynamics will be completely driven by expectations about future monetary conditions.
Self-ful…lling Collapses
In this subsection, we characterize equilibria for which monetary conditions constantly deteriorate over time. We interpret this kind of equilibrium as a self-ful…lling collapse of the banking system characterized by a persistent decline in the amount of notes in circulation driven by expectations that future monetary conditions will persistently deteriorate. As we will show, this kind of equilibrium will have an adverse impact on the real economy. In particular, the quantities produced and traded in the decentralized market will monotonically decline over time.
Note that
for any R > 0. As a result, we have
which means that (21) de…nes an implicit mapping R t = f (R t 1 ) that is strictly increasing.
In particular, we have
which means that the mapping R t = f (R t 1 ) crosses the 45-degree line from below at (R t 1 ; R t ) = (1; 1). Note also that, for any initial condition R 0 > 1, there will be no equilibrium because the condition R t 1 will necessarily be violated at some …nite date t. See Figure 2 .
For any initial condition R 0 2 (0; 1), there exists a unique equilibrium trajectory that is strictly decreasing. Along this equilibrium path, the individual debt limits, given by B t = a (R t ), decrease monotonically over time and converge to zero. This means that the equilibrium allocation approaches autarky as t ! 1. As a result, the exchange value of currency depreciates over time as the face value of notes persistently declines. As a result, buyers and sellers will be able to trade smaller amounts of goods in the decentralized market.
We can interpret this kind of equilibrium as a self-ful…lling collapse of the banking system.
As we have seen, the determination of equilibrium quantities and prices totally depends on people's beliefs regarding future monetary conditions. Because people believe that the exchange value of notes will persistently decrease over time, the amount of funds devoted to each banker will be lower today. This also means that the number of notes in circulation today will be lower. In fact, the number of notes in circulation will monotonically decrease over time, resulting in a decreasing amount of goods traded in the decentralized market.
From a buyer's standpoint, his demand for notes will decrease over time because the purchasing power of notes is depreciating over time, allowing him to purchase ever smaller amounts of goods from sellers.
As we have seen, any e¢ cient allocation implies a constant quantity of goods produced and traded in the decentralized market, which requires a stable supply of bank notes over time. As a result, the kind of nonstationary equilibrium we have characterized in this subsection is necessarily ine¢ cient.
Discussion
We have shown that a purely private monetary system is capable of implementing a constrained e¢ cient allocation. However, the existence of other equilibria with undesirable properties for initial conditions arbitrarily close to R 0 = 1 implies that such a system is necessarily unstable. These equilibria arise because there is no condition to pin down the initial choice of the face value of notes. As a result, multiple beliefs about the exchange value of notes in future periods are consistent with an equilibrium outcome. In particular, some of these equilibria will be characterized by a persistent decline in the supply of notes.
In this respect, inside money shares some of the same characteristics as outside …at money, namely, indeterminacy of equilibrium. 4 One can argue that a nonstationary equilibrium of the kind described above may be very hard to be observed because it requires that expectations about the future exchange value of notes have to change signi…cantly over time, something that would not easily occur in practice. However, we argue in Section 7 that such an argument is inconsistent with the historical evidence: Banking panics with the same characteristics as those described above frequently occurred in the U.S. during the period in which privately issued monies were the dominant circulating medium.
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Suppose the government intervenes by granting a privilege (or subsidy) to a fraction 2 (0; 1) of bankers. If these bankers follow the government's policy with respect to note issue, then each one of them will receive a subsidy, in the form of lump-sum payments, such that his lifetime utility is at least the same as his lifetime utility in the case in which he chooses not to accept the privilege. The government will impose a lump-sum tax on each buyer to …nance the subsidy payments.
Equilibrium
denote the path of note creation for each banker who accepts the government privilege. We restrict attention to equilibria in which people treat the notes issued by privileged bankers and those issued by other bankers as perfect substitutes. In this case, the function a (R t ) de…ned in (17) continues to represent the aggregate demand for notes, so the amount of resources devoted to each nonprivileged banker at date t is given by
To guarantee that each privileged banker voluntarily follows the government's prescription with respect to the amount of notes to be issued at each date, the subsidies fs t g 1 t=0 must satisfy
at each date t 0. To guarantee that sellers accept the notes issued by privileged bankers, the path D t 1 t=0 must be such that the condition
holds at each date t 0. This condition ensures that a particular choice of a monetary
by the government is consistent with the convertibility constraints so that the notes issued by the privileged bankers and those issued by other bankers will be treated as perfect substitutes. Note that we treat the subsidy payments as unobservable, so the convertibility constraints must be satis…ed without taking into account the subsidy payments.
Now it is straightforward to de…ne an equilibrium in the presence of intervention.
De…nition 4 A symmetric monetary equilibrium is a sequence R t ; D t ; s t 1 t=0
and
at each date t.
Note that if the government chooses = 0, then the dynamic system is exactly the same as that derived in the previous section, given by (21) . Now consider monetary regimes
for which the amount of notes issued by privileged bankers remains bounded, and suppose the government chooses an arbitrarily small fraction of bankers to receive the subsidy. Because the government chooses both the quantity of notes that each privileged banker is supposed to issue at each date and the fraction of privileged bankers, it is able to keep the total amount of these notes, given by D t , within any bounded interval. In this case, we can use standard methods to determine the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium; see, for instance, Azariadis (1993) and Woodford (2003) . Note that (24) is a non-autonomous, nonlinear di¤erence equation describing the evolution of the variable R t for any given government policy. De…neR t R t 1. Then, a linear approximation to (24) is given bŷ
where
Because b > 1, this equation can be solved forward to obtain a unique bounded solution
In other words, there exists a su¢ ciently small neighborhood around R = 1 such that the unique equilibrium can be approximated by (26) . This means that the equilibrium value of notes today depends on the future path of government policies with respect to the amount of notes issued by privileged bankers.
It remains to verify whether (23) is consistent with an equilibrium outcome in which the notes issued by privileged bankers and those issued by other bankers are treated as perfect substitutes. Again, we can make arbitrarily small to justify the local approximation because the government is able to choose the fraction of privileged bankers and still satisfy the convertibility constraints.
Example 5 Suppose the government instructs privileged bankers to follow the policy D t =
(1 + t) 1 at each date t 0, where 0 < < . In this case, for su¢ ciently small,
it is possible to keep the equilibrium value of R t arbitrarily close to one by appropriately choosing a small value for .
Because the equilibrium value of notes depends on the future path of government policies, monetary conditions will remain relatively stable in the case in which the government keeps the aggregate amount of notes issued by privileged bankers within a su¢ ciently small neighborhood of zero. This means that the face value of notes will remain within a small neighborhood of one, implying arbitrarily small ‡uctuations in the aggregate supply of notes. As a result, the quantity of goods produced and traded in the decentralized market will remain within an arbitrarily small neighborhood ofq. It is convenient to summarize the previous …ndings in the following proposition. that results in a unique symmetric monetary equilibrium in which the face value of notes R t remains arbitrarily close to one and the aggregate amount of notes issued by privileged bankers D t remains within an arbitrarily small neighborhood of zero. The unique equilibrium path fR t g 1 t=0 can be approximated by (26) .
In summary, we have characterized a government intervention that ensures the determinacy of equilibrium. The intervention described above provides a condition for determining the initial choice of the equilibrium value of notes, guaranteeing the stability of the monetary system.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Economists have long debated the existence of a genuinely free-banking regime in monetary history. Two well-known historical episodes are the free banking era in the U.S. from 1837 to 1863 and the Scottish banking system from 1800 to 1845. 5 In both cases, there were virtually no barriers to entry (except perhaps the minimum capital required to start a bank) and banks were free to issue paper currency redeemable in specie to the public subject to some restrictions.
One of the restrictions on the creation of bank notes in the U.S. was the requirement that designated government bonds had to be deposited with the state authority as reserves for all circulating notes issued by a bank. One of the reasons for imposing this condition was the widespread concern that banks could overissue notes. In our framework, the most e¤ective limit on the overissue of private notes is the public's willingness to accept these notes in bilateral trades. In other words, the amount of notes issued by the banking system is bounded by people's willingness to use them as a medium of exchange. For the e¤ectiveness of this self-correcting mechanism, it is crucial that the trading history of each banker is publicly observable and that traders have periodic access to a centralized location where privately issued notes can be redeemed.
In addition to the overissue of bank notes, another common criticism of a free-banking regime is that banking panics are more likely to occur. Banking panics occurred frequently during the free banking era as well as in the subsequent period from 1864 to 1914, known as the national banking era. 6 It is also a well-known fact that the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 has not signi…cantly reduced the recurrence of banking panics, with its pervasive e¤ects on the money supply.
The nonstationary equilibria characterized above can be surely interpreted as a self-fulling 5 See Weber (1983, 1984 ) for a critical re-examination of the U.S. free banking era. See White (1984) for a description of free banking in Scotland. 6 Rolnick and Weber (1984) have argued that the majority of bank failures during the free banking era can be attributed to the fact that state authorities required government bond deposits to secure the issuance of bank notes.
panic, much like the banking panics observed throughout the aforementioned period. Our analysis has shown that, in these equilibria, the exchange value of bank notes persistently depreciates over time, consistent with some of the historical episodes. Also, we have shown that the goal of stability requires the government to follow a speci…c operational procedure.
Thus, the mere creation of a monetary authority does not necessarily guarantee the stability of the monetary system. Finally, the kind of government intervention we have characterized in this paper has some support in the historical evidence. For instance, the Bank of England, far from behaving as a typical pro…t-maximizing institution, was heavily in ‡uenced and overtly supported by the British government throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, receiving several privileges from Parliament.
CONCLUSION
We have characterized the properties of a purely private monetary system using the Lagos-Wright framework. The key frictions are people's inability to commit to their future promises and a lack of common knowledge of trading histories for most individuals. Those who have access to a record-keeping technology are able to issue liabilities that circulate as a medium of exchange and enjoy a higher lifetime utility than that associated with autarky precisely because of their note-issuing privileges. We have referred to these agents as bankers.
In our analysis, individual debt limits are endogenously determined, so each banker's ability to issue notes today depends on beliefs about the exchange value of his notes in future periods. As a result, there can be multiple equilibria under a purely private monetary system. Some of these equilibria have undesirable properties. In most cases, we observe a self-ful…lling collapse of the banking system in which the balance sheet of each banker persistently shrinks along the equilibrium path. In these equilibria, the amount of notes in circulation persistently declines over time as note holders permanently reduce their demand for these notes, adversely a¤ecting real quantities. In particular, people will be able to trade ever smaller quantities of goods because of a persistent depreciation of the exchange value of privately issued notes. We have shown that all of these equilibria are necessarily ine¢ cient, which naturally gives rise to the formulation of government policies.
The government intervention has the role of stabilizing monetary conditions, guaranteeing that the economy remains arbitrarily close to the constrained e¢ cient allocation. Thus, it naturally provides an operational procedure for guiding the decisions of a monetary authority.
Our analysis has con…rmed the conjecture that a purely private monetary system can be unstable. Even though the conjecture that a free-banking system is capable of implementing an e¢ cient allocation seems to be correct, according to our analysis, the claim that such a system can also be stable is certainly not true. Thus, the view that free banking can create a sound monetary framework ignores the role that endogenous debt limits play in the creation of private money. Our analysis has shown that the creation of a monetary authority, equipped with an operational procedure of the kind described above, is su¢ cient to ensure monetary stability. 
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